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I.  INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 2001, the Supreme Court of the United States issued
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources.1  Many attorneys, especially those
representing the public interest, had been nervously awaiting the
results.  In what will probably become known as the most significant
attorney’s fees decision of the generation, the Supreme Court
overturned virtually every federal jurisdiction regarding the legality
of awarding attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” under the
“catalyst theory.”  However, the Court went further, strongly hinting
toward the possible invalidation of the rule, previously approved in
every jurisdiction, that a plaintiff can “prevail” and collect attorney’s
fees by obtaining a favorable settlement.  As a result of Buckhannon’s
potentially far-reaching implications, nearly every public interest
attorney must now consider the question: “Does Buckhannon apply
to my case?”
In light of Buckhannon, many new legal issues have arisen.  What
categories of successful plaintiffs now qualify for fees under fee-
shifting statutes?  Can a successful party of a private settlement still
qualify as a “prevailing party”?  Is Buckhannon’s rule limited to the
1. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532
U.S. 598 (2001).
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two “prevailing party” fee-shifting provisions specifically at issue, or
does it extend to fee-shifting statutes that use modifying terms such as
“substantially prevailing party?”  If the latter, which statutes with
provisions employing similar “prevailing party” language will be
affected?  This note attempts to fill Buckhannon’s photo album with
snapshots of its first eighteen months of life and beyond, covering all
of its trials and tribulations through late November 2002.
Section II briefly describes the facts of the case and provides an
analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision.  Section III divides the post-
Buckhannon issues into two categories.  First, it generally discusses
the applicability of the decision to other fee-shifting provisions in
statutes such as the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), the
Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the
Clean Air Act (CAA), and the Clean Water Act (CWA) with
particular attention paid to the different fee-shifting language each
employs.  Second, it analyzes lower court decisions with respect to the
particular level of success a litigant must achieve before an award may
be given.
II.  BUCKHANNON: FACTS AND DECISION
A. The “American Rule”
Every discussion of attorney’s fees must begin with a brief
discussion of the 1975 Supreme Court ruling in Aleskya Pipeline Co.2
There, the Supreme Court strictly adhered to the “American Rule”
stating that “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect
a reasonable attorney’s fee from the loser.”3  As indicated, there are
several exceptions to this rule.  The most significant exception occurs
when Congress authorizes the courts to award attorney’s fees to a
prevailing litigant.4  Thus, there is a general practice of not awarding
fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority.5  This
note will focus on the authorizing language found in federal statutes
that utilize this exception.6
2. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
3. Id. at 247.
4. Id.
5. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
6. In addition to this exception, there are three other judicially recognized exceptions to
the American Rule.  First, a court can enforce its own orders by assessing attorney’s fees for the
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B. The Facts
The Buckhannon Board and Care Home (BBCH) provided
residents with comfortable living conditions without the institutional
aura of a nursing home.  Among its residents was 102-year-old
Dorothy Pierce.7  Four years after Pierce moved into BBCH, West
Virginia’s Office of Health Facility Licensure and Certification
ordered BBCH to evacuate the premise within thirty days for failing
to meet the state’s self-preservation rules.8  These rules required all
residents of assisted living homes to have the ability, without
assistance, to evacuate the premises in the event of imminent danger
such as fire.9  At the time of the order, BBCH had three residents,
including Ms. Pierce, who were not capable of self-preservation under
the statute.10  Pierce’s son-in-law, speaking for Ms. Pierce, stated that
it “would be traumatic for her to be forced to move.”11
Pierce and BBCH filed suit in the Fourth Circuit against the
State of West Virginia and other defendants challenging the self-
preservation rules as inconsistent with the Federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 198812 (FFHA) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 199013 (ADA).14  At the time, many other states
had implemented the more flexible fire safety standards adopted by
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).15  After Plaintiffs
filed suit, the state of West Virginia reviewed these more flexible
willful violation of a court order.  Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258.  Second, courts are empowered to
award fees against a losing party who has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.  Id. at 258-59.  Finally, a court’s equitable powers allow it to award fees in
commercial litigation to plaintiffs who recovered a common fund for themselves and others
through securities or antitrust litigation.  Id. at 257.
7. Brief for Appellant at 3, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep’t of
Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (No. 99-1848).  Pierce continued to live at BBCH
until she died at age 105.  Id.
8. Id. at 2.
9. W. VA. CODE §§ 16-5C-2(f), 16-5H-2(f) (1997) (as amended at 16-5H-2(j) (1998)).
10. Appellant’s Brief at 3, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., (No. 99-1848).
11. Id.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1995) stating: “In a civil action. . .the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and
costs.”
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1995), stating: “In any action or administrative proceeding
pursuant to this Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses. . . .”
14. Appellant’s Brief at 3, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., (No. 99-1848).
15. Id. at 4-5  (explaining that this flexible approach allowed for three tiers of evacuation
capability: prompt, slow, and impractical).
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standards and ultimately adopted them, repealing its self-preservation
statutes.16  Defendants accordingly changed their legal stance and
successfully petitioned to render the case moot.  Plaintiffs then moved
for an award of attorney’s fees arguing that their lawsuit served as the
catalyst that sparked the adoption of the amended laws and led to the
ultimate relief they sought and received.17  Plaintiff’s theory of
obtaining such a fee award, known as the “catalyst theory,” had been
adopted as a valid means of obtaining attorney’s fees by every federal
jurisdiction except Plaintiff’s—the Fourth Circuit.18  It was therefore
unsurprising that, in an unpublished opinion, Plaintiffs were denied
attorney’s fees at the appellate level.19  Seeking to overturn this rebel
Circuit’s precedent, Plaintiffs sought and received a grant of certiorari
from the Supreme Court on September 26, 2000.20
C. The Decision
In a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Ms. Pierce’s
estate was denied attorney’s fees.  Under the ADA and the FHAA,
only a “prevailing party” may be awarded attorney’s fees.21  As
mentioned earlier, the normal practice among the federal courts was
to construe the term “prevailing party” broadly.  The Supreme Court,
however, had never visited the issue as it pertained to the “catalyst
theory.”22  Consulting Black’s Law Dictionary and Supreme Court
precedent, the Court held that the “catalyst theory” was not a viable
method for recovery under the two statutes at issue.  However, the
Court went further, deeming “prevailing party” to be a “legal term of
art,” and indicating its intent to usurp from the list of “prevailing
parties” those successful litigants who entered into private
settlements—a position never before adopted in any federal
jurisdiction.23
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 9.
18. See S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), in denying attorney’s fees under the “catalyst theory,” but
allowing an award of fees “by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent
decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought” (emphasis added)).
19. Appellant’s Brief, at xvii, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., (No. 99-1848).
20. Id.
21. Under both the ADA and the FHAA, a court, “in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party. . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.”  See supra, notes 12, 13.
22. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.5.
23. Since the Fourth Circuit still regarded private settlements as a viable method to award
fees under this term, see supra note 18, the Supreme Court’s indication that private settlements
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Fairly stated, the specific holding was that “the ‘catalyst theory’ is
not a permissible basis for the award of attorney’s fees under the
FHAA and ADA.”24  However, the Court clearly intended to further
limit the possible situations in which successful plaintiffs using fee-
shifting statutes may seek fee awards for their success.  The opinion
failed to adopt a single formulation of what level of success a
“prevailing party” must achieve, instead defining “prevailing party” in
a number of ways:
● “A party in whose favor a judgment is rendered”25
● A “successful party”26
● “[O]ne who has been awarded some relief by the court”27
● One who receives “judgment on the merits” of his claim28
● Requiring a “court-ordered ‘change [in] the legal relationship
between [the plaintiff] and the defendant’”29
● Requiring a “material alteration of the legal relationship of
the parties”30
● Requiring a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal
relationship between the parties”31
● One that requires an “enforceable judgment” on a case “not
found to be moot”32
With so many possible roads to follow, Buckhannon has left the
lower courts struggling to determine where to draw the line of success
warranting an award of attorney’s fees.
III.  POST-BUCKHANNON: THE ISSUES NOW BEFORE THE COURTS
Prior to the Buckhannon decision, every Federal Circuit court
except the Fourth and the Federal Circuit (which had not addressed
the issue) had determined that the “catalyst theory” was a valid
do not contain the requisite “judicial imprimatur” attempts to extend the breadth of the term to
an unprecedented level.
24. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
25. Id. at 603 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 605.
29. Id. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S.
782, 792 (1989)).
30. Tex. State Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989).
See also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
31. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
32. Id. at 609.
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method of awarding attorney’s fees under fee-shifting statutes.33  The
law seemed to have been settled consistently among the circuits, with
the exception of subtle differences in the tests used to determine
whether plaintiff’s actions acted as a “catalyst” for defendant’s
compliance.34
Since Buckhannon, courts have grappled with two very broad
issues.  The first involves the extent to which the Court’s decision
reaches statutes other than the FHAA and ADA.  Is the Court’s
decision limited to these two statutes, or does it extend to all
attorney’s fees statutes using “prevailing party” language?  Further,
does it extend to statutes using similar or more discretionary language
in determining what constitutes a successful party?  If a court holds
that Buckhannon applies to the statute in question, it must then
address the second issue: What procedural types of successes merit
the badge of “prevailing party”?  Each of these issues will be analyzed
in turn.
A. Issue I: The Extension of Buckhannon to Other Fee-Shifting
Statutes
There are currently over 150 statutes containing “fee-shifting”
provisions available to litigants in the United States.  The language
that grants an award of attorney’s fees to a successful litigant varies
from statute to statute.  A typical fee-shifting provision includes two
elements: (1) the type of success a petitioning litigant must achieve,
33. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-81 (1st Cir. 1978); Gerena-Valentin v.
Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1984); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare,
758 F.2d 897, 910-917 (3d Cir. 1985); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318-1319 (4th Cir. 1979)
(predating S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d 49, which was the Fourth Circuit case that eventually overruled
the viability of the “catalyst theory”); Iranian Students Ass’n v. Sawyer, 639 F.2d 1160, 1163
(5th Cir. Unit A March 1981); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 985 F.2d 255, 257-58 (6th Cir. 1993); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982);
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Andersen, 569 F.2d 1027, 1029 (8th Cir. 1978);
American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1981); J & J Anderson,
Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1985); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379
(11th Cir. 1982); Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108-1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
34. Compare Stewart, 675 F.2d at 851 (identifying a two factor test: (1) whether the
litigation benefited the plaintiff and members of the class, and (2) whether the lawsuit acted as a
catalyst, or was a material factor in the defendant’s decision to change the disputed practices
and therefore provide, in substantial part, the relief sought.), and Southwest Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944 (9th Cir. 2001) (also identifying a two-part test: (1)
whether the lawsuit was causally linked – i.e., the lawsuit was a catalytic factor -  to securing the
benefit obtained, and (2) the benefit obtained was required by law as opposed to a gratuitous
act by the defendant), with Grano, 783 F.2d at 1111 (requiring “some basis in law for the
benefits ultimately received by [a successful] litigant”).
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and (2) the level of discretion given to the court to award such fees.35
For example, the Clean Water Act36 states that the court may award
costs of litigation:
“to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party. . .” (—type of
success—)
“. . . whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.” (—
level of discretion—)
These two elements operate independently of each other.37  Thus the
court’s analysis must first center on the petitioner’s level of success.
After this issue is concluded, the court must weigh certain variables in
the case to appropriately exercise its congressional grant of discretion.
In many situations, the statutory authorization will emphasize (or
even ignore completely) one of these two elements.  This note has
broken down the various fee-shifting provisions into five general
categories, which are briefly outlined below.38
In the first type of provision, a court is normally given broad
discretion to award fees to parties achieving “prevailing party” status.
Examples of statutes empowering courts with this authority include
the Equal Access to Justice Act39 and the two Buckhannon statutes:
the Americans with Disabilities Act40 and the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988.41
In the next three commonly utilized provisions, a party must at
least “prevail.”  But Congress has modified the term according to
varying circumstances.  In one situation, attorney’s fees are
mandatory if the plaintiff “finally prevails.”  Such statutes include the
Commodity Exchange Act,42 the Magnuson-Moss Act,43 the Packers
and Stockyards Act,44 and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities
35. See Union of Needlestrades, Indus. and Textile Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v.  U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,  202 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2001).
37. See Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
38. Id.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000) (“Except as otherwise specifically provided by
statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses. . .incurred by that
party in any civil action . . .”).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
42. 7 U.S.C. § 18(d) (2000) (“If the petitioner finally prevails, he shall be allowed a
reasonable attorney’s fee . . .”).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (2000).
44. 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (2000).
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Act.45  In many provisions, a successful party must have “substantially
prevailed” in order for a court to consider an award of fees.  Statutes
employing this language include the Freedom of Information Act,46
the Privacy Act,47 and the National Historic Preservation Act.48  The
final category of statutes utilizing the root word “prevail” include the
Clean Water Act49 and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act.50  In these statutes, “any prevailing or substantially prevailing
party” is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees.
The next category seems less concerned with a litigant’s level of
success, focusing instead on judicial discretion.  For example, on its
face, the Clean Air Act51 allows the court latitude to award fees
whenever it “determines that such an award is appropriate.”52  But as
we will see, despite statutory absence of a level-of-success provision,
the Supreme Court has read a “prevailing party” requirement into
this language, severely curtailing the level of judicial discretion.53  This
language is most commonly found in environmental statutes such as
the Toxic Substances Control Act,54 the Endangered Species Act,55 the
45. 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (2000).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (2000) (“The court may assess against the United States
reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this
section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.”).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i) (2000).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 470w-4 (2000) (“[I]f such person substantially prevails in such action, the
court may award attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and other costs of participating in such
action, as the court deems reasonable.”).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1370(e)(1) (2000) (“In any action brought under this section, the court in its
discretion may award all or a portion of the costs and expenses incurred in connection with such
action, including reasonable attorney’s fees, to any party who prevails or substantially prevails in
such action.”).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2000) (“In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court
may award costs of litigation. . .whenever it determines that such award is appropriate.”).
52. In some statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, a court is given such discretion only
after it is determined whether or not the party “prevails” in some manner.  The Clean Water
Act at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000) states that the court “may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.”  Other statutes, such as the Toxic
Substances Control Act and Clean Air Act, only use the discretionary “whenever appropriate”
language.
53. See section III(A)(2)(e) of this note for discussion.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (2000). (“The decision of the court . . . may include an award of
costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys . . . if the court determines that such an award is
appropriate.”).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000) (“The court . . . may award costs of litigation to any party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.”).
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Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,56 the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act,57 the Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act,58 the Deepwater Port Act,59 the Safe Drinking Water
Act,60 the Noise Control Act,61 the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act,62 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.63  For purposes of
this note, this standard will be referred to as the “whenever
appropriate” standard.
In a few situations, a litigant need only show that he has been
“successful” in order to be eligible for attorney’s fees.  Examples of
statutes employing this language include the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act,64 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,65 and the Right to
Financial Privacy Act.66  This category is briefly discussed in the same
breath with the “whenever appropriate” language below under “non-
’prevailing party’ statutes.”
Finally, in rare circumstances (and outside the scope of this
note), Congress has severely restricted the court’s discretion by
prescribing an award based on the degree of relief the claimant
obtained in the underlying litigation.  The Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 199567 and the Clayton Act68 employ such language.
1. The Extension of Buckhannon to Other “Prevailing Party”
Statutes
The statutes at issue in Buckhannon were the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA)69 and the Americans with
56. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
57. 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (2000).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (2000).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (2000).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (2000).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (2000).
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(5) (2000). (“In any successful action to enforce the liability under
this paragraph, the court may award the court costs of the action together with a reasonable
attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§1681n(c), 1681o(b) (2000).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a)(4) (2000) (stating the amount of the fee is proportionately related
to the court ordered relief for violation).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(B)(i).
68. 15 U.S.C. §15(a) (1990) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. . . shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
KLEIN - FINAL.DOC 03/04/03  2:41 PM
Fall 2002] DOES BUCKHANNON APPLY? 109
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).70  Both statutes employed “prevailing
party” language.71 The Supreme Court held that “the ‘catalyst theory’
is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney’s fees under the
FHAA and ADA.”72  Thus, logically, one of the first issues to arise in
the lower courts was whether Buckhannon applies only to the two
statutes explicitly discussed or whether the Court’s reasoning extends
to all statutes employing the “prevailing party” language.  After a
brief split among the circuits, this issue is now the only one on which a
consensus has been reached, not only among the circuits, but
seemingly among litigants as well.73
Several years before Buckhannon, the Federal Circuit noted:
“Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the definition of
‘prevailing party’ does not differ from rule-to-rule or statute-to-
statute.”74  The Buckhannon Court approved this precedent, stating
that in the two statutes at issue there, “Congress employed the term
‘prevailing party,’ a legal term of art.”75  A “legal term of art,” is quite
a significant label.  According to a 1952 Supreme Court decision,
“Congress borrows terms of art [which have] accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice.”76  According to the
Court, when Congress adopts such a term, it recognizes that the term
connotes a particular meaning “to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.”77  However, labeling “prevailing party” a “legal term of
art” is quite a curious conclusion given that the “judicial minds” of
the Supreme Court voted closely (5-4) on the issue.  More notably,
every circuit court to have previously addressed the issue except the
Fourth Circuit held a different view than the Supreme Court’s narrow
majority.  Even more extraordinary is that, in branding the term with
such status, the Court provided no discussion or analysis whatsoever
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1990).
72. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (citations omitted).
73. See N.Y. State Fed’n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi and Limousine
Comm’n, 272 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2001) (Both plaintiff and defendant “acknowledged that this
reasoning has become the law.”).
74. Schultz v. United States, 918 F.2d 164, 166 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983)).
75. 532 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added).
76. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (discussing the intent requirement
for theft, which was omitted from a federal statute, but the Court held that the omission did not
eliminate intent as an element of the offense).
77. Id.
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as to why Congress would have designated the term as such.78
Instead, the Court cited Black’s Law Dictionary, as the majority
apparently believed it to contain such “legal terms of art.”79
Regardless of its rationale, the Court provided litigants with a narrow
window of escape, which may prove important, especially when
extending Buckhannon to non-”prevailing party” language: if
Congress offers “explicit statutory authority” to the contrary, only
then may lower courts follow Congress’ alternate definition.80
Because the Court labeled “prevailing party” as a legal term of
art, analysis of whether Buckhannon applies to other statutes using
the “prevailing party” language must be answered in the affirmative.
In case there was any doubt, the Supreme Court provided additional
guidance by referring to three “prevailing party” statutes not at issue,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1975, and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (§
1988), and then stated that the Court has “interpreted these fee-
shifting provisions consistently.”81  As briefly indicated below, lower
courts have dutifully extended Buckhannon to these and other
“prevailing party” statutes.
a. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (§ 1988)
In November 2001, the Second Circuit proclaimed, “[d]espite the
fact that the holding in Buckhannon applied to the FHAA and ADA,
it is clear that the Supreme Court intends the reasoning of the case to
apply to § 1988 as well.”82  Three months later, in applying
Buckhannon to § 1988, the Fourth Circuit broadened its scope to
78. Justice Scalia gives a one-page rambling explanation as to why he feels “prevailing
party” qualifies as a legal term of art, but he too fails to provide any citation as to why Congress
recognized it as such.  See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 615-16, (Scalia, J. concurring).
79. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.  As Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted, dictionaries provide
guidance only on the general usage of a particular term, but are silent as to the intended
meaning in a specific context.  Thus, if Congress employs a term as a “legal term of art,” it is to
the legislative history one must turn for guidance.  Id., at 628 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).  As one
commentator has recognized, “[i]f courts resolved controversial legal issues by the mechanical
process of opening up Black’s Law Dictionary, our nation would not need judges interpreting
the law.”  Paolo Annino, The Buckhannon Decision: The End of the Catalyst Theory and a
Setback to Civil Rights, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 12 (Jan-Feb. 2002).
80. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602.  See also Union of Needlestrades, Indus. and Textile
Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 265,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
81. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602-03 n.7.
82. N.Y. State Fed’n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi and Limousine
Comm’n, 272 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2001).
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include all “prevailing party” statutes, declaring that the term
“prevailing party” must be “‘[i]nterpreted. . .consistently’ – that is,
without distinctions based on the particular statutory context in which
it appears.”83  Courts within the First,84 Third,85 Eighth,86 Ninth,87 and
Tenth88 Circuits also quickly followed the Supreme Court’s lead,
extending Buckhannon to § 1988.
b. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The Second Circuit found supporting language for extending
Buckhannon to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) in Supreme Court precedent: “[T]he standards used to
interpret the term “prevailing party” under any given fee-shifting
statute are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has
authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’”89  The court
rejected arguments that legislative history of the IDEA made
Buckhannon inapplicable.
However, district courts within the Seventh Circuit Have split on
the issue.  Of the four IDEA cases in the Northern District of Illinois
to address Buckhannon’s applicability to the IDEA, three have
applied Buckhannon, while one has not.90 In both Brandon K. v. New
Lennox School District and Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Township High
School District, each district court mechanically applied Buckhannon
to the IDEA.91  In contrast, the court in T.D. v. La Grange School
83. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at
603 n.4).
84. Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
85. Farley v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11390 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
86. Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 167 F.Supp. 2d 1094, (D.S.D. 2001).
87. Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2001).
88. Effertz v. Barton Co., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (10th Cir. 2001).
89. J.C. v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119, 123 (2nd Cir. 2002) (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983)).  The court averted Buckhannon’s exception by
concluding that the legislative history of the IDEA did not provide “explicit statutory authority”
to the contrary.
90. Compare Brandon K. v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 2001 WL 1491499 (N.D. Ill. E. Div.
2001), (Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist. 204, 2001 WL 1000734 (N.D. Ill. 2002),
and Koswenda v. Flossmoor Sch. Dist. 161, 2002 WL 31415744 (N.D. Ill 2002) (all applying
Buckhannon) with T.D. v. La Grange Sch. Dist. 102, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (N.D. Ill. E. Div.
2002) (analyzing the text, structure and legislative history of the statute to conclude that
Buckhannon should be inapplicable to the IDEA).
91. Brandon K., 2001 WL 1491499 (applying Buckhannon because the Court referred to
similar fee shifting statutes including § 1988.).  See also Jose Luis R. 2001 WL 1000734 (stating
that nothing in Buckhannon limited the holding to the two statutes at issue).
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District analyzed the text and structure of the IDEA and found that
“critical distinctions” between it and the statutes directly at issue in
Buckhannon existed.  For example, the court noted that the statutory
text of the IDEA, unlike the FHAA or the ADA, refers to settlement
as a basis for fees.92  Also, the court quoted a provision allowing in
some instances fees for mediation.  Thus, the court hesitantly
concluded: “I may be wrong. . . [but] the Court’s ruling in
Buckhannon was not meant to extend to the IDEA.”93
In an opinion issued less than three weeks later, the court in
Koswenda v. Flossmoor School District disagreed with T.D., asserting
that many of the IDEA’s differences purported by T.D. are in fact
found in the ADA.94  Finding T.D. unpersuasive, the court went on to
apply Buckhannon to the IDEA.95
The Eighth Circuit,96 the District of the District of Columbia97
and the Southern District of New York98 have all extended
Buckhannon’s rationale to the IDEA.
c. Equal Access to Justice Act
At least one decision held, before it was reversed, that the
“catalyst theory” was still an available claim under the “prevailing
party” language of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),99 despite
Buckhannon’s indication to the contrary.100  In deciding Brickwood I,
the Court of Federal Claims did not treat the two elements of fee-
shifting provisions independently;101 rather, it combined both elements
and focused on the fact that the EAJA requires a court to “consider
the merits of the underlying lawsuit” before giving an award to a
92. T.D., 222 F. Supp. 2d at *8-9 (analyzing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D) (2000)).
93. Id.
94. Koswenda, 2002 WL 31415744, at *8 (noting that both statutes involve a similar multi-
tiered administrative process).
95. Id. at *9.
96. John T. v. Iowa Dept. of Educ., 258 F.3d 860, 863-64 (8th Cir. 2001)
97. Akinseye v. Dist. of Columbia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 134, 136-40 (D.D.C. 2002) (following
the Second Circuit’s decision absent precedent from the D.C. Circuit)
98. J.S. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) states: “[A] court shall award fees to a prevailing party . . .
unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified.”
100. See Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 738 (2001) vacated by
Brickwood Contractors, 288 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
101. See discussion in Union of Needlestrades, Indus. and Textile Employees, AFL-CIO,
CLC v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), or refer
to part I (A) above.
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plaintiff by considering whether the defendant’s position “was
substantially justified.”102  This requirement, the court argued, differed
from the statutes at issue in Buckhannon because the court was
required to take into consideration the merits of a defendant’s
position before it determined whether to award the plaintiff fees.
Since the finding of judicial merit was the rationale behind
Buckhannon’s holding, the court held that the plain language of the
EAJA was not hindered by the Supreme Court’s ruling.103  In
addition, because the statute presumed the award after the
“substantially justified” analysis (“shall award to a prevailing party”
instead of the “may award” provision of the FHAA and the ADA),
the court argued that the EAJA was intended by Congress to apply to
different circumstances.  Finally, the court analyzed legislative intent
to decipher the purpose of the EAJA, finding that this intent would
be best preserved if Buckhannon did not apply.104  In other words, if
the court’s first two arguments failed under appellate scrutiny, the
third argument tried to persuade that the EAJA fell within the
“explicit statutory authority” exception of Buckhannon.
The Brickwood I decision gave hope to litigants filing for fees
under “prevailing party” language who feared that Buckhannon
would apply across the board to all “prevailing party” statutes.  In the
Ninth Circuit, one plaintiff tried to persuade the court that the
“catalyst theory” was alive and well under the EAJA, using
Brickwood I as the backbone of his argument.105  In Perez-Arellano
the Ninth Circuit shunned Brickwood I’s holding, reasoning that the
different textual language in the EAJA “does not address at all the
definition of ‘prevailing party.’”106  The court did not address
Brickwood I’s “explicit” Congressional intent argument.107
Courts in other circuits also disagreed with Brickwood I, holding
that the EAJA fell within Buckhannon’s guise.  Within a year of
102. See Brickwood Contractors, 49 Fed. Cl. at 746.
103. Id. at 746-47.
104. Id. at 179.  The court found that the goal of Congress in enacting the EAJA was to
provide small businesses and individuals with access to the courts which they otherwise would
not have had.  Extending Buckhannon to the EAJA, the court argued, would compromise this
goal.  However, the Brickwood I court could not point to any “explicit” Congressional language.
105. Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 794 n.4.
107. Id.
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Buckhannon, courts within jurisdictions of the Second,108 Fifth,109 and
Seventh110 Circuits agreed with the Ninth111 Circuit that Buckhannon
extended to the EAJA.  The Court of International Trade also
followed suit.112  Seven years prior to Buckhannon, the Sixth Circuit
had already approached and answered the question, noting that
Congress intended the EAJA’s “prevailing party” provision to be
read consistently with other fee-shifting statutes. 113  The Brickwood I
decision thus seemed an aberration, and indeed it was: Twenty-six
days before Buckhannon celebrated its first birthday, the Federal
Circuit overturned the decision.114  Among the reasons for its
conclusion, Brickwood II discounted the lower court’s finding that the
EAJA’s legislative history was explicit enough to show that Congress
intended a contrary definition of “prevailing party.”115  The extension
of Buckhannon to all “prevailing party” statutes (absent an exception
due to “explicit statutory authority”) seems ostensibly complete.116
2. The Possible Extension of Buckhannon to Statutes Using the
Root Word “Prevail”
Since “prevailing party” was the specific phrase deemed a “legal
term of art” by the Supreme Court’s decision, the next question in
Buckhannon’s wake is whether statutes that utilize other
modifications of the word “prevail” should be included within the
scope of the decision.  Terms such as “substantially prevail” or
“finally prevail” are common in fee-shifting provisions.117  One canon
of construction instructs that statutory use of different terms evinces
108. See Albodun v. McElroy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3519 (2d Cir. 2002) (mechanically
extending Buckhannon to EAJA in a half-page opinion).
109. See Alcocer v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543, *3
(N.D. Tex. 2001) (interpreting Buckhannon to “strongly insist[] a court respect ordinary
language in its interpretation of the term ‘prevailing party’”).
110. See Sileikis v. Perryman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12737 (N.D. Ill.  2001).
111. Id.
112. See Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Products v. U.S., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1370
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2001).
113. Heeren v. City of Jamestown, 39 F.3d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 1994).
114. Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371,  (Fed. Cir. 2002).
115. Id. at 1369-70.
116. There is even precedent for the extension of Buckhannon to contracts containing the
term “prevailing party.”  Utility Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co., Inc., 298
F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2002).
117. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
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congressional intent to express different meanings.118  However,
another canon states that the use of similar language in different
statutes presumes application of the same interpretive standards.119
But since the Court interpreted the term “prevailing party” as a “legal
term of art,” should not the first canon be the most informative?  The
inquiry is whether the term “prevailing party” is the exclusive carrier
of the Buckhannon syndrome, thereby leaving congruent terms
immune, or whether the term “prevail” is the operative root,
providing an open wound for Buckhannon’s venom to infect
numerous other fee-shifting statutes.
By the time Buckhannon blew out its first birthday candle, only
two courts had addressed this question.120  Both analyzed the issue in
the context of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and both
held that Buckhannon’s assault on fee-shifting provisions had indeed
contaminated all such “prevailing” language. Several significant
arguments are emerging in the lowers courts regarding Buckhannon’s
extension to these types of statutes.  Each is discussed below.
a. Footnote Four
Buckhannon’s ambiguity regarding its limitations has provided
opposing sides with a great deal of room to argue either for or against
its extension to statutes  useing the root word “prevail.”  Parties
wishing to extend the opinion to these statutes will take solace in
Buckhannon’s footnote four.  As mentioned, the Supreme Court
recognized that congressional use of the term “prevailing party” was
not unique to the statutes at issue in Buckhannon.121  However, after
listing several examples that used the exact language at issue, the
stelliscript set the stage for a future coup d’état by inexplicably
118. See Legacy Emanuel Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Shalala, 97 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“The use of different language by Congress creates a presumption that it intended the terms to
have different meanings.”) (citing Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 146 (D.C. Cir.
1986)).
119. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 692 (1983) (comparing the similar
wording of § 304(d) and § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act and concluding that the similar language
is evidence of Congressional intent to equate the two statutes).
120. Union of Needlestrades, Indus. and Textile Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv, 202 F. Supp. 2d 265, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Oil, Chem.
and Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 456-57 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
121. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602-03 (citing The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k); The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e); The Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and, generally, Marek v. Chesny, 473
U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985)).
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including among this list the entire appendix of Justice Brennan’s
dissenting opinion in Marek v. Chesney,122 which cataloged over one-
hundred fee-shifting statutes containing virtually every variation of
fee-shifting language.123  In footnote four, following the reference to
this appendix, the Court stated, “[w]e have interpreted these fee-
shifting provisions consistently.”124
Champions for Buckhannon’s extension to “prevail”-rooted
statutes therefore are justified in arguing that the Marek citation
means that, regardless of terminology, Buckhannon’s hand guides not
only “prevailing party” statutes, but also every statute listed in
Marek.125  At issue in Marek was whether an award of “costs” to a
litigant included “attorney’s fees.”  In dissent, Justice Brennan
divided 118 fee-shifting statutes into three broad categories.  Each
category described a separate relationship between “costs” and
“attorney’s fees” according to statutory language.126  Thus, Marek’s
appendix actually demonstrates how fee-shifting provisions have been
inconsistently interpreted according to differing statutory language.
Later in footnote four, Buckhannon cites to footnote seven in Hensley
v. Eckerhart to support the proposition that Marek’s list has been
interpreted consistently.127  However, Hensley’s footnote seven
compares only “prevailing party” statutes and concludes by stating
“[t]he standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all
cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a
‘prevailing party.’” 128
How then does one make sense of Buckhannon’s inexplicable
citation to Marek’s appendix?  The court in Union of Needlestrades
argued for incorporation of the appendix, stating that the Supreme
Court “implicitly acknowledged that, in fact, the language of the
statutes varied and that the Court nonetheless interpreted their
122. Id.
123. Marek, 473 U.S. at 44-51.
124. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.4 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7
(1983)).
125. See Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.2d 662, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2001) (using the
Marek citation as an indication of the Court’s intent to apply Buckhannon to all fee-shifting
provisions).
126. Marek, 473 U.S. at 43-51.  The three categories were: (1) statutes that refer to
attorney’s fees “as part of the costs,” (2) statutes that do not refer to attorney’s fees as part of
the costs, and (3) statutes that may or may not refer to attorney’s fees as part of the costs.
127. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.4.
128. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
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provisions ‘consistently.’”129  But a stronger and contrasting argument
can be made that the Court was simply citing to Marek in order to
provide the reader with a list that comprehensively contained other
“prevailing party” statutes.  This explanation would be consistent
with Buckhannon’s failure to specifically cite non-”prevailing party”
statutes and the opinion’s approval of its extension to the CRA of
1964, the VRAA of 1975, the CRAFAA of 1976, and Hensley, all of
which employ or discuss only “prevailing party” language.  The
Marek appendix is thus an isolated and inconsistent example
presented in Buckhannon that includes both “prevailing party” and
non-”prevailing party” statutes.  Although Rehnquist’s inclusion of
the Marek appendix sets the stage for the Court to expand
Buckhannon to both “prevailing” and non-”prevailing” fee-shifting
statutes alike, courts should resist using footnote four’s rationale to
extend Buckhannon to fee-shifting provisions other than those
employing “prevailing party” language, especially since other
persuasive rationale exists for its extension.
b. “Prevail” as the Operative Word
A second (and perhaps more persuasive) argument for the
expansion of Buckhannon to several “prevailing” fee-shifting statutes
is that “prevailing” is the operative word “from which the term of
art. . . derives its definition.”130  Under this theory, the word
“prevailing” is a term used to connote differing degrees of success,
whether it is modified by the terms “substantial,” “finally,” or left
unmodified, as long as the litigant’s success is manifested in some
success on the merits.131
While Buckhannon does not explicitly state that it adheres to this
theory, the main issue in Buckhannon is whether a litigant has
attained a procedural achievement that meets the legal definition of
“prevail.”  Thus, there is some merit to the argument that the word
“prevail” provides the muscle in the term “prevailing party.”  The
Court, in defining “prevailing party,” referenced Black’s Law
Dictionary, which contained the exact term.132  However, the word
“prevail,” according to Black’s, is substantially broader than
129. Union of Needlestrades, Indus. and Textile Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
130. Id at 280-81.
131. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 689-90 (1983); see also Needlestrades, 202 F.
Supp at 283.
132. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.
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“prevailing party” and is defined as: “[t]o be or become effective”, “to
obtain”, and “[t]o succeed.”133  This definition is nearly identical to its
definition in Webster’s Dictionary.134  But the word prevail cannot be
read to embody one connotation in one set of attorney’s fees statutes
and convey its ordinary sense in another simply because Congress
added a suffix to the root to make the term grammatically correct.
Thus, the issue of whether the differing terms should be afforded
different meanings should instead focus on the modifying language
accompanying “prevailing,” such as “substantially” or “finally,”
instead of focusing solely on the root word “prevail.”  This note
analyzes the modifier “substantially” as an example.
Because the base term “prevailing party,” modified or
unmodified, is consistently found in various fee-shifting statutes, it
would be trite to argue that Congress intended separate meanings for
that specific term.  The issue thus becomes how does the term
“substantially” modify “prevailing party”?  Since it is impossible to
achieve greater procedural success than a judicial order on the merits,
any argument that a litigant must achieve success greater than
“prevailing party” status must fail.  Rather, the question is whether
the term allows for a lesser degree of success for a plaintiff to qualify
for an award.  Black’s Law Dictionary fails to define “substantially
prevailing party”.  Black’s, however, does define the term
“substantial” as “actually existing; real; of considerable value.”135  No
quantifiable modifiers such as “nearly” or “almost” are listed—the
definition is limited to substantive success.  In at least one instance,
Congress has indicated that it defines “prevailing party” the same as
one who has “substantially prevailed.”136  Combined, these arguments
lead to a persuasive conclusion that “prevailing” and “substantially
prevailing” parties are synonymous, leaving little rationale that the
term “substantially” will create a greater probability that a successful
party may achieve “prevailing party” status.  In fact, one court has
133. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (6th ed. 1991).
134. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1067 (3d College ed.
1991) (meaning to be “effective” or to “succeed”).
135. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428.
136. See Internal Revenue Code, 26 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A) (2002) (stating: “In general, the
term “prevailing party” means any party . . . which:
(I) has substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy, or
(II) has substantially prevailed with respect to the most significant issue or set of issues
presented.”)
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argued that “the modifier ‘substantially’ might make it more difficult
to attain such status:
To put this in concrete terms, a FOIA plaintiff may seek thousands
of documents but wind up with a judgment providing only a
handful of insignificant documents.  One might say this plaintiff was
a prevailing party, but nevertheless not say that the plaintiff
substantially prevailed.137
Thus, unless Congress explicitly states otherwise, non-quantifiable
modifiers such as “substantially” should have no effect on whether a
party is legally considered to be a “prevailing party.”138  It is untenable
to argue that Congress meant to attach materially different legal
consequences to the term “prevail” when it attached to it such
modifiers.  As of late November 2002, this author was unable to find a
case in which the court failed to extend Buckhannon to such a
statute.139
c. Buckhannon’s Criticisms Exist in the “Substantially
Prevailing” Framework
Every one of the Court’s criticisms of the “catalyst theory” can
be applied in the “substantially prevailing” context.  For example,
attorney’s fees could still be awarded without a successful party
obtaining a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of
the parties.”  A court may be authorized to award fees in this context
despite a plaintiff’s failure to establish that the complaint could
survive a motion to dismiss when defendant abandons his claim for
reasons other than legal considerations (such as lack of money or fear
of public backlash).
137. Oil, Chem. &  Atomic Workers Int’l, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C. Cir 2002).
138. An example of a quantifiable modifier would be “partially.”  To this author’s
knowledge, no fee-shifting provision contains quantifiable modifiers.  However, if Congress
passed a fee-shifting provision allowing “partially prevailing” parties to recover, it is likely that
dicta from Ruckelshaus would provide the necessary distance to prevent Buckhannon from
applying to such language.  In Ruckelshaus, the court noted that section 307(f) was “meant to
expand the class of parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing to partially prevailing parties –
parties achieving some success.” Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 945.  Thus, the Court indicated that a
“partially prevailing” party would require a less stringent test than the one provided in
Buckhannon.
139. See, for example, Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13847 (W.D. Vir. 2002) (extending Buckhannon to the Magnuson-Moss Act’s, 15 U.S.C. §
2310(d)(2) term “finally prevails”); See also Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d 452, and
Union of Needlestrades, Indus. and Textile Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 202 F. Supp. 2d 265, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (extending Buckhannon to
FOIA’s “substantially prevailing” language).
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Another criticism cited by the Buckhannon Court was the
“second major litigation” lower courts had employed to determine
whether plaintiff’s allegations prompted defendant’s cessation of his
actions.140  A decision to award fees required inquiry into defendant’s
“subjective motivations” and could turn on inferences from
defendant’s conduct.  This issue would be prevalent in the
“substantially prevailing” framework as well.
Finally, the Buckhannon Court cast aside concerns that
mischievous defendants would be encouraged to unilaterally moot an
action on the steps of the courthouse.141  Without statistical proof that
Buckhannon has indeed led to such action, the Court is sure to
remain steadfast in this argument when faced with “substantially
prevailing” fee-shifting statutes.  Thus, all of the same concerns
remain in this context, and one could foresee the Court extending
Buckhannon to “substantially prevailing party” statutes under this
rationale.
d. “Explicit Statutory Authority”
Whether “explicit statutory authority” exists must be analyzed
on a statute-by-statute basis.  At least one court has addressed the
issue as it applies to the “substantially prevailing” language in FOIA.
The D.C. Circuit in Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union agued that FOIA’s legislative history was too inconclusive to
merit a deviation from the Buckhannon position.142  However, in
Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council,143 Judge Friendly analyzed
the legislative history of FOIA, noting that it was “unusually
complete.”144  The committee reports basically advise courts as to the
discretion they should use in awarding fees once it determines
whether a party has prevailed.145  The D.C. Circuit was correct in
concluding that the issue of whether or not a party “prevailed” was
not discussed.146  Therefore, at least in the context of FOIA, no
140. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609-10.
141. Id. at 608.
142. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 456-57.
143. Vt. Low Income Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1976).
144. Id. at 512.
145. Id. at 512-13.  See also H.R. REP. No. 93-876 (1974), reprinted in Legislative History of
the Freedom of Information Act, 1974 Amendments 126-27 & n.10 (1975); S. REP. No. 93-854
(1974), reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 170.
146. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d, at 456-57.
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“explicit statutory authority” has been found that would dispute
Buckhannon’s applicability.
e. Applicability of Ruckelshaus
Another clue to deciphering whether the Supreme Court will
extend Buckhannon to the “substantially prevailing” framework is
the Court’s possible adherence to the belief that, unless explicitly
stated otherwise, Congress intends all fee-shifting language to award
only “prevailing parties.”  In a 1983 opinion also written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Court read a “prevailing party” requirement
into the fee-shifting provision of the Clean Air Act, a provision
containing no reference either to “prevailing party” language or any
other level-of-success requirement.147  Instead, the statute contained
only the discretionary “whenever [the court] determines that such an
award is appropriate” standard.  Thus, one could expect an argument
based on Ruckelshaus to go something like this: If  “prevailing party”
status is required to receive fees in non-”prevailing party” statutes,
then certainly it will extend to “substantially prevailing” statutes.  An
in-depth analysis of this case, Ruckelshaus, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency v. Sierra Club is provided in the
next section, arguing that Ruckelshaus should in no way be used to
extend Buckhannonto any fee-shifting statute.
f. Conclusion: Whether Buckhannon Extends to Fee-Shifting
Statutes Employing the Root Word “Prevail”
The Court may have a justifiable basis to expand Buckhannon to
other fee-shifting provisions that use the root word “prevail.”  The
rationale should be limited to the observation that “prevail” is the
operative word, or that the same policy reasons that existed in
Buckhannon are present in the case being considered.  Using
Buckhannon’s ambiguous reference to the Marek appendix in
footnote four, or the Court’s opinion in Ruckelshaus to extend
Buckhannon to statutes using the root “prevail,” simply goes too far.
And, as always, legislative history should be analyzed to determine
whether alternate “explicit” intent exists.
3. Does Buckhannon Have a Limit?  The Possible Extension to
Non-”Prevailing Party” Statutes
There is concern among many public interest plaintiffs that
147. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. 680.
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several precedential Supreme Court opinions will be used as a link to
extend Buckhannon to every fee-shifting statute, regardless of
Congress’s conscious attempt to omit or relax a level-of-success
requirement.  Two cases justify reason for concern.  However, as
opinions regarding non-”prevailing party” provisions begin to trickle
in, courts generally appear reluctant to extend Buckhannon based on
these two opinions.
The first case of analysis, Ruckelshaus, has the distinction of
being one of the most relevant cases to determining the breadth of
Buckhannon’s application while preceding the Buckhannon decision.
Its interpretation in relation to Buckhannon is paramount to
environmental litigants and their attorneys since the majority of
environmental fee-shifting statutes contain non-”prevailing party”
language.148  Thus, this note finds it necessary to examine this
important case in order to illuminate why Buckhannon’s holding
should not be extended to non-”prevailing party” language.
Those in favor of Buckhannon’s extension will covet the second
case of analysis, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for
Clean Air, for Justice White’s strong dicta.  There the court seemed to
indicate that fee provisions in environmental statutes should be
interpreted the same as civil rights statutes, such as § 1988.  But much
of the language of this case seems to contradict the holding of
Ruckelshaus, and considering it was written only three years after
Ruckelshaus with the unanimous support of the Court, a distinction
must exist.  This case will be discussed in depth after Ruckelshaus.
a. Ruckelshaus
Ruckelshaus was decided in 1983, eighteen years before
Buckhannon, and was also written by Justice Rehnquist.  In
Ruckelshaus, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Sierra
Club each brought suit against the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) under the Clean Air Act.  The EDF alleged that emission
standards promulgated by EPA had been tainted by inappropriate
agency ex parte contacts with private industry.  Alternatively, the
Sierra Club argued that EPA did not have the authority to issue such
standards.  The D.C. Circuit rejected all claims alleged by both
parties. 149  However, in two subsequent opinions, the court
148. See supra notes 54-62.
149. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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unanimously decided that it was “appropriate” to award attorney’s
fees to each plaintiff under § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act.150
Section § 307(f) states: “In any judicial proceeding under this
section, the court may award costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it determines that such an
award is appropriate.”151  Thus, of the two elements described as
characteristic of fee-shifting provisions in section I(A) above, only the
second (judicial discretion) is present in this provision.  The level of
success requirement is noticeably absent.  The First Circuit had
previously determined that such language suggested great judicial
latitude in awarding fees, stating:
“The purpose of an award of costs and fees . . . is to allocate the
costs and litigation equitably, to encourage the achievement of
statutory goals.  When the government is attempting to carry out a
program of such vast and uncharted dimensions, there are roles for
both the official agency and a private watchdog.”152
In awarding fees to the Sierra Club and EDF, the D.C. Court of
Appeals reasoned that both parties, as watchdogs, had indeed
encouraged the achievement of such statutory goals, and thus
qualified for fees.153  However, the court noted that “occasions upon
which non-prevailing parties will meet such criteria [will be]
exceptional.”154
When the issue reached the Supreme Court, the question was
whether Congress, in adopting such statutory language, intended
courts to have discretion to award attorney’s fees to a party who
achieved no success on the merits after a full trial.  Read in light of
Buckhannon, the Court’s decision is somewhat confusing and
contradictory.
As will be discussed in section III(B) of this note, there are four
basic levels of  plaintiff success as it relates to an award of attorney’s
fees.  Depending on statutory language, plaintiffs have historically
been awarded a fee entitlement for the following procedural victories:
(1) a favorable judicial order on the merits, (2) the procuring of a
150. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 684
F.2d 972, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  The Sierra Club was awarded $44,715, plus $644.60 in expenses;
the EDF was awarded $45,874.10.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1976).
152. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1st Cir. 1973) (emphasis
added).
153. Sierra Club, 672 F.2d. at 34.
154. Id. at 39.
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consent decree,155 (3) contracting a private settlement, and (4)
defendant’s voluntary cessation of an action without legal obligation
to do so (“catalyst theory”).  The Buckhannon Court interrupted this
precedential practice, drawing the line for a fee entitlement
somewhere between a consent decree (number 2 above) and a private
settlement (number 3 above). The issue in Ruckelshaus did not
concern any of these categories; instead the Court had to decide
whether no level of success might qualify, an issue never considered
in Buckhannon.  However, seemingly in line with Buckhannon, the
Ruckelshaus Court concluded that “some success on the merits [must]
be obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award.”156
Remaining consistent, the Ruckelshaus Court also stated, “a fee
claimant must ‘prevail’ before it may recover attorney’s fees.”157
However, a closer look at Ruckelshaus reveals a deviation from
Buckhannon’s definition of the term “prevail.”  The Ruckelshaus
Court noted legislative history of § 307(f) providing judges discretion
to award attorney’s fees for plaintiffs using the “catalyst theory,” a
level of success not on the merits.  In its discussion of the legislative
history of § 307(f), the Court pointed out that the 1970 Senate Report
contained the following explanation of how the “whenever
appropriate” standard extends to the “catalyst theory,” giving new
meaning to the traditional “prevailing party” language:
“The Courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate actions
under [Section 307(f)] citizens would be performing a public service
and in such instances the courts should award costs of litigation to
such party.  This should extend to plaintiffs in actions which result in
successful abatement but do not reach a verdict.  For instance, if as a
result of a citizen proceeding and before a verdict is issued, a
defendant abated a violation, the court may award litigation expenses
borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting such actions.”158
Later in its opinion, the Court noted the discrepancies among the
lower courts in defining the term “prevailing party”:
“Some courts — although, to be sure, a minority — denied fees to
plaintiffs who lacked a formal court order granting relief, while
others required showings not just of some success, but ‘substantial’
success.  Indeed, even today, courts require that, to be a ‘prevailing
party’ one must succeed on the ‘central issue.’”159
155. See note 168 (defining consent decree and explaining its use).
156. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.  See also id. at 694.
157. Id. at 686.
158. Id. at 686 n.8 (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 38 (1970))(emphasis added).
159. Id. at 688 (quoting Coen v. Harrison County Sch. Bd., 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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The Supreme Court determined that the legislative history of §
307(f)160 was “intended to eliminate [courts’] restrictive readings of
‘prevailing party,’ thereby expanding it to incorporate the “catalyst
theory.” 161  In other words, according to Ruckelshaus, Congress
explicitly intended, and the Supreme Court approved, the use of the
catalyst theory as a viable method for obtaining fees under the
“whenever appropriate” standard.162  In doing so, the Court failed to
foresee the confusion it would create with its impending Buckhannon
decision.  Ruckelshaus simply included the “catalyst theory” under
Congress’s definition of a “prevailing party” (at least in this
situation), as was consistent with the majority view at the time.
Modern courts looking to Ruckelshaus as a guide to see whether
Buckhannon should be extended must take more than a cursory
glance.  By reading a “prevailing party” requirement into the
“whenever appropriate” standard,163 Ruckelshaus tempts modern
courts to extend Buckhannon to similarly worded statutes.164  But
couple this aspect of Ruckelshaus with the Court’s understanding that
Congress intended inclusion of the “catalyst theory” in the “whenever
appropriate” standard, and Ruckelshaus contradicts Buckhannon’s
holding that the “catalyst theory” does not qualify as a “prevailing
party.”  Thus, courts today analyzing Ruckelshaus’ requirement that a
“prevailing party” must be read into a fee-shifting statute, regardless
of an omission of any level-of-success requirement, must realize that
Ruckelshaus and Buckhannon differed in their understanding of what
types of successes were considered to achieve “prevailing party”
status.  It follows that Buckhannon’s rationale is not controlling in
non-”prevailing party” statutory situations.
If today’s courts find the above analysis of Ruckelshaus to be
unpersuasive in distinguishing Buckhannon’s rationale, perhaps a
better interpretation of Ruckelshaus is found in the Court’s
160. Id. at 686 n.8, (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 38 (1970)).
161. Id. at 688.
162. Id. at 686-87 n.8 (“Congress found it necessary to explicitly state that the term
appropriate ‘extended’ to suits that forced defendants to abandon illegal conduct, although
without a formal court order; this was no doubt viewed as a somewhat expansive innovation,
since under then-controlling law, . . . some courts awarded fees only to parties formally
prevailing in court.”).
163. See also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 182 F.3d 1091, 1095 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the Supreme Court has read a prevailing party requirement into the Endangered Species Act).
164. See Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
Court in Buckhannon emphasized the similarity of most federal fee-shifting statutes).
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recognition that Congress explicitly intended the “whenever
appropriate” standard to qualify as an exception to Buckhannon’s
stated general rule.  Certainly Ruckelshaus determined that § 307(f)
met Buckhannon’s requirement for “explicit statutory authority” for
allowing recovery under the “catalyst theory.”
By late November 2002, only a handful of courts had expressed
an opinion on the issue of Buckhannon’s extension to non-”prevailing
party” provisions.165  In the “whenever appropriate” context, the
Eleventh Circuit has thus far provided the most comprehensive
analysis in Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County.166
There, a lawsuit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)167 was filed
against a Florida county alleging that its lack of measures to protect
endangered sea turtles was resulting in unauthorized takings.168  After
four years of litigation, the county adopted more stringent beachfront
lighting regulations, resolving the problem, mooting plaintiffs’
claim.169  Based on the “catalyst theory,” the district court held that
plaintiffs were entitled to an award of fees, finding that the lawsuit
was the primary impetus for the adoption of the regulations.170
Arguing that Buckhannon invalidated the catalyst theory under the
ESA, the county appealed.171
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held Buckhannon inapplicable
to the ESA for three reasons.  First, the court found “clear evidence
that Congress intended that a plaintiff whose suit furthers the goals of
a “whenever. . . appropriate” statute be entitled to recover attorney’s
fees.”172  Because legislative history of the ESA provided little
guidance on the matter, the court turned to Ruckelshaus, noting that
the Supreme Court had already analyzed the legislative history of the
“whenever appropriate” standard in the context of the Clean Air
Act.173  After reviewing the legislative material summarized in
165. See Jim Hecker, “Catalyst Theory” for Fee Awards in Environmental Suits Survives
‘Buckhannon,’ 32 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1797 (2001) (considering Buckhannon issues in the
context of environmental statues containing non-”prevailing party” provisions).
166. Loggerhead Turtle v. The County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 307 F.3d 1318
(11th Cir. 2002).
167. 16 U.S.C. 1531
168. Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d at *1-2.
169. Id. at *1-6.
170. Id. at *7-8.
171. Id. at *9.
172. Id. at 18.
173. Id.
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Ruckelshaus, the court found “unambiguous evidence that Congress
intended the ‘whenever. . . appropriate’ fee provisions of the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act to allow fee awards to plaintiffs who do
not obtain court ordered relief but whose suit has a positive catalytic
effect.”174  Since both statutes only briefly preceded the ESA and were
drafted with exactly the same language, the court found it likely that
Congress intended the ESA provision to have the same effect.175
Second, the court reasoned that because Buckhannon “makes no
reference whatsoever” to the “whenever appropriate” standard,
Buckhannon likely does not apply outside the “prevailing party”
context.176  Finally, in “prevailing party” scenarios, the Buckhannon
court was not persuaded by the argument that the catalyst theory is
necessary to prevent “mischievous defendants” from avoiding liability
for fees by voluntarily changing their conduct.177  Such a fear, the
Court argued may only materialize “in claims for equitable relief.”178
Thus, the Loggerhead Turtle court argued that because suits under
the ESA may only seek equitable relief, this policy argument does not
exist in the “whenever appropriate” context.179
Several district courts within the Ninth Circuit have also
addressed Buckhannon’s potential extension to the ESA.  The court
in Southwest Center, holding that Buckhannon did not apply to the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), was most persuaded by the fact that
“the ‘whenever . . .appropriate’ language of the ESA is
distinguishable on its face from the ‘prevailing party’ language of the
civil rights statutes.”180  The court also acknowledged the Ruckelshaus
Court’s “implicit[] recogni[tion] [of] Congressional intent to adopt the
174. Id. at 21-22.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 22.  The court’s statement that “Buckhannon makes no reference whatsoever” to
the “whenever appropriate” standard is not entirely correct.  As mentioned earlier,
Buckhannon cited to the entire appendix of Justice Brennan’s dissent in Marek v. Chesney .
Among the statutes Brennan listed were the CWA, the CAA, and the ESA.  Thus, albeit
indirectly, Buckhannon did reference the “whenever appropriate” standard.  See subparagraph
III(A)(2)(a) above.
177. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608-09.
178. Id. at 608.
179. Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d at *23.  (“[T]he very policy consideration underlying the
Buckhannon opinion actually cuts the other way in the contest of “whenever . . . appropriate”
statutes.”)
180. Southwest, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 947. See also id. at 948 (“Given the Court’s increased
reliance on the plain meaning of the specific language used by Congress in its statutes . . . we are
disinclined to extend the Court’s interpretation to language that is dissimilar on its face.”).  At
the time of publication, Southwest Center is being appealed.
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‘catalyst theory’ of attorney’s fee awards in statutes, such as the CAA,
that contain the ‘whenever . . . appropriate’ standard.”181  Similarly, in
EPIC v. Pacific Lumber Company, the court interpreted Ruckelshaus
as an indication that the “whenever appropriate” standard creates a
“less-demanding standard than that of the civil rights statutes.”182  The
court went on to hold Buckhannon inapplicable to the ESA.
The fourth and final case discussing this issue as it applies to the
ESA reached the same conclusion.  In Center for Biological Diversity
v. Norton, the Tenth Circuit likewise noted the differing language
between the “prevailing party” and “whenever appropriate” statutes,
concluding that “Buckhannon is not applicable [to the ESA].”183
However, since neither party in that case raised the issue, the court
declined to authoritatively decide it.184
Outside of the “whenever appropriate” standard, at least one
court has reached a contrasting result regarding Buckhannon’s
applicability to non-”prevailing party” provisions.  In Crabill v. Trans
Union, L.L.C.,185 Judge Posner indicated that Buckhannon extended
to all fee-shifting statutes.  The relevant statute was the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), which allows recovery of attorney’s fees “in
the case of any successful action . . .”  Seemingly, the court accepted
Buckhannon’s (following referral to Black’s Law Dictionary)
indicationthat “prevailing party” means “successful.”186  The court
then applied this meaning to the FCRA’s language.  But Posner also
cited to Buckhannon’s footnote four and Scalia’s concurring theory
that “a litigant ‘who left the court emptyhanded gets no fees.”187 This
interpretation is likely to be used later by the Seventh Circuit - and
possibly others - to conclude that Buckhannon applies to all fee-
shifting provisions. Adhering to the Seventh Circuit’s rationale188 that
“success” and “prevailing” are synonymous, the Eleventh Circuit has
stated that it agrees with Posner’s conclusion with regard to the Fair
181. Id. at 947.
182. Environmental Protection Information Center v. Pacific Lumber Company, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17909, *12 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
183. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1080 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2001).
184. Id.
185. Crabill, 259 F.3d at 666-67.
186. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.  See also supra text accompanying note 26.
187. Crabill, 259 F.3d at 666.
188. Crabill, 259 F.3d at 666-67.  See also supra text accompanying note 26.
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Credit Reporting Act, a similarly worded statute.189  However,
Posner’s dictum in this opinion contains almost no analysis190 or
research and could be easily sidestepped in other jurisdictions.191
To conclude, there are several reasons why Ruckelshaus’
indication that a “prevailing party” must be read into all fee-shifting
statutes (regardless of a statutory omission of any level of success
requirement) should not be used to extend Buckhannon to
“whenever appropriate” statutes. First, in contrast to Buckhannon,
the Ruckelshaus Court’s interpretation of the definition of “prevailing
party” includes success via the “catalyst theory.”  Second,
Ruckelshaus contemplates the issue of awarding fees where there had
been no success at all and any application to other scenarios of a
plaintiff’s success is merely dicta.  Third, the Court recognizes
“explicit statutory authority” in the legislative history by expanding
the scope of a judicial award to plaintiffs invoking the “catalyst
theory.”  Fourth, several courts have indicated that the difference
between the “prevailing party” and “whenever appropriate”
provisions are clearly distinguishable on their face.192  Fifth, policy
reasons stated in Buckhannon do not apply in the “whenever
appropriate” context.  Finally, it must be mentioned that, for the
same reasons given above (see section II (A)(2)(a)), Buckhannon’s
footnote four is ambiguous and one cannot conclude its extension
applies to this issue as well.
b. Pennsylvania
In the other relevant Supreme Court decision, Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, the pertinent issue
was whether the Clean Air Act authorized fees for time spent by
counsel in regulatory proceedings. 193  In other words, the crux of the
issue in Pennsylvania was what type of attorney “action” warranted
189. Nagle v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 297 F.3d 1305, 1307  (11th Cir. 2002)(holding
that the primary difference between the FCRA and the FDCPA’s attorney’s fees provisions is
that the FDCPA allows for both statutory and actual damages, while the FCRA only allows
actual damages).
190. See, for example, section III(A)(2)(a) of this note above for an analysis of
Buckhannon’s footnote four.
191. The Nagle opinion of the Eleventh Circuit, merely agreed with Crabill’s “result” as it
applied to FCRA, without proclaiming adherence to its rationale.  While this seems to provide a
little wiggle room for other statutes, it certainly appears that the Eleventh Circuit has already
decided the issue with respect to the FCRA.
192. E.g. see fn. 162-165 and accompanying analysis.
193. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 548 (1986).
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recovery of fees.  In answering this question, the Court analyzed
circuit court precedent in the context of the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976 (§ 1988) and determined that post-judgment
monitoring of consent decrees was compensable.194  Analogizing civil
rights statutes with environmental statutes, the Court suggested that
the purposes of each was sufficiently similar “to interpret both
provisions governing attorney’s fees in the same manner.”195  Leaving
the door cracked, the Court stated that analysis of the respective
legislative histories “lends credence” to such an interpretation.196
However, unlike Ruckelshaus, Pennsylvania had nothing to do with
“prevailing parties.”  The plaintiff had already prevailed; the issue
centered on the amount.  Thus, Pennsylvania’s holding, in light of
Ruckelshaus’ approval of the “catalyst theory” in the “whenever
appropriate” standard, should be limited to the issue of what type of
actions attorneys may recover fees for providing.  Pennsylvania and
its dicta have been distinguished by at least one circuit court on
similar grounds.197  Also of note in Pennsylvania is the fact that two of
the Justices, dissenting as to a non-relevant portion of the opinion,
warned that the Court “rush[ed] to judgment” and the Court’s haste
would only “confuse the federal courts.”198
B. Issue II: Judicial Recognition of a Plaintiff’s Level of Success
Once it is determined that Buckhannon extends to the particular
statute at issue, the plaintiff faces another hurdle.  To increase the
chance of a fee award, the plaintiff must characterize his success in
such a way as to receive judicial sanctioning. But, in many situations,
Buckhannon offered only vague guidance as to how this may be
accomplished.
194. Id. at 559.
195. Id. at 560.
196. Id. at 559 (explaining that the purposes behind both legislative histories are nearly
identical, which provides support for the idea that they should be interpreted similarly).
197. See Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944, 948 (9th Cir.
2001) (distinguishing Pennsylvania for two reasons: (1) the court was analyzing the same word,
(“action”) contained in both statutes and not prevailing parties, and (2) the current court’s
“increased reliance on the plain meaning of the specific language used by Congress in its
statutes.”).
198. Pennsylvania, 478 U.S. at 569 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
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1. A Brief Introduction to Buckhannon’s Levels of Success
Subjectively, plaintiffs may deem any number of procedural or
substantive victories as successes.  For example, surviving a motion
for a directed verdict or receipt of a temporary restraining order
constitute procedural successes.  Buckhannon, however, was
concerned only with substantive successes.  In other words, the Court
was concerned only with whether a plaintiff achieved at least some of
the relief sought in the complaint.  As can be inferred from
Buckhannon, there are four broad categories of successful plaintiff
outcomes.199  In order of the strength of the plaintiff’s legal victory,
they are as follows:
(1) A favorable judicial order on the merits
(2) The procuring of a consent decree200
(3) Contracting for a private settlement
(4) A defendant’s voluntary cessation of the offensive action
without a legal obligation to do so (otherwise known as the
“catalyst theory”)
The Buckhannon decision clearly settled any confusion as to whether
categories (1) and (4) qualified as “prevailing parties.”  However,
appellate courts are puzzled as to the specific type of judicial
recognition Buckhannon requires before an award may be granted to
a successful plaintiff under categories (2) or (3).  Inconsistent
appellate decisions have resulted from this uncertainty.
Regarding instances of judicially approved orders, the court
recognizes by order that the defendant has violated the plaintiff’s
legal rights.  In this situation, a plaintiff may be awarded a judgment
199. While almost every case will fall under one of these four categories, a recent California
district court decision held that “prevailing party” status could, in some circumstances, be
awarded for a preliminary injunction.  There, a preliminary injunction caused defendant to
change its conduct.  Thus, although summary judgment was eventually entered on behalf of
defendant, “plaintiffs received relief from the Court which instituted a change in the legal
relationship between the parties.”  See Vanke v. Block, No. CIV.98-4111 DDP, *4-5 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
200. Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (2001)
(holding that a consent decree is “an order of the court compelling the defendant to comply
with specified terms, not because the court has independently concluded that the plaintiff is
entitled to that relief, but because the defendant has voluntarily agreed to those terms”).  See
also Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523 n.13 & 525 (1986)
(holding that “consent decrees have become widely used as devices to facilitate settlement” due
to the prospect of continued oversight and ease of enforcement by the courts; the decree must
(1) “spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,”
(2) “come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings,” and (3) “further the
objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.”).
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on the merits of his claim after a full trial; therefore, there is no doubt
that a successful plaintiff “prevails” for purposes of attorney’s fees.201
The Buckhannon Court also explicitly upheld fee awards if a
plaintiff’s success fits under the broad but blurred umbrella of consent
decrees. It stated that because a consent decree is a “court-ordered”
change in the legal relationship of the parties, a plaintiff “prevails,”
regardless of whether a defendant admits liability.202
In a settlement agreement, each party negotiates with respect to
his interests, taking into consideration such factors as the probability
of success if the case went to trial, or the ability to finance continued
litigation.  Courts view settlement agreements as analogous to
contracts, and may retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of their
terms.  However, courts do not speak to the liability of either party or
the merits of each side’s individual claims regarding the issue
presented in the case.  Therefore, Buckhannon indicates that
traditional settlement agreements do not contain the necessary
judicial imprimatur to warrant an award of fees.203
Lastly, a plaintiff may successfully achieve partial relief through
defendant’s voluntary cessation of its offensive conduct.  This theory
of success is better known as the “catalyst theory.”  In such situations,
the court issues no orders and does not determine liability.  The
defendant, seeing little or no chance of success, acquiesces to
plaintiff’s wishes, though sometimes only temporarily.  The case may
or may not be rendered moot after the defendant ceases his action.
As mentioned, Buckhannon specifically rejected a fee award under
the catalyst theory, thereby lying to rest the so-called “split” among
the Circuits.204
The issue remaining for lower courts to decide is where on this
continuum a successful plaintiff will cease to legally “prevail” for
purposes of a fee award.  May a court award attorney’s fees to
successful parties in a private settlement, or must there be judicial
recognition of the success?  Courts have taken several approaches to
finding an answer to this question.  The results have created vastly
different, and very intriguing results.
201. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 604 n.7.
204. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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2. Drawing the Line
The Supreme Court fell short of holding that fees may be
recovered only by way of either a consent decree or a judicial order
based on the merits of the claim.205  The fact pattern the Court had
before it disallowed the formulation of an exhaustive list of the
various forms of judicial relief that a plaintiff could obtain to warrant
a fee award.  After consulting Supreme Court precedent, the
Buckhannon Court concluded that the requisite judicial
determination for an award of fees must include a “material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.”206  Examples of such
“material alteration” include “enforceable judgments on the merits
and court-ordered consent decrees.”207
A closer look at Buckhannon reveals that the Court also left
open the possibility that other “material alterations” exist.  For
example, the Court indicated that private settlements “incorporated
into [an] order of dismissal,” qualify as a judicially accepted “material
alteration” that warrants a fee award.208  Two members of the majority
also noted their belief that court-approved settlements bore the
necessary judicial imprimatur.209  Lower courts are in agreement that,
despite the Court’s previous indications to the contrary,210
Buckhannon implied that private settlements lacking judicial
sanctioning are now precluded from an award of fees.211  In doing so,
the Court tailored the requisite level of a litigant’s success more
narrowly than any court had ever done.  Even the Fourth Circuit, the
lone Circuit to reject the “catalyst theory” prior to Buckhannon, had
deemed a plaintiff of a settlement agreement to be a “prevailing
party” as long as he had secured at least a “settlement giving some of
205. Id. at 604.  See also Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities, 173 F. Supp. 2d at
1278; Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Dep’t. of Energy, 288 F.3d at 460 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting.)
206. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)).
207. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
208. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7.
209. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.)
210. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (The Court suggested here that a party
may “prevail” in some scenarios by virtue of a private settlement.).
211. Compare Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing the Court’s indication, but holding that the 9th Circuit is bound by prior precedent)
with all cases in note.
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the legal relief sought.”212  But, regardless of the lower court’s
universal recognition of the path the Supreme Court chose to follow,
the courts have split in applying this dictum.
As discussed, courts have varied their approaches in deciphering
where Buckhannon draws the award/no award line, and which of the
many standards set forth should be applied.  A majority of federal
courts (within the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and
Eleventh circuits) have held that Buckhannon limits “prevailing
parties” to parties who have received either a consent decree or final
judicial order on the merits.213  This interpretation requires plaintiffs
to receive a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of
the parties,” or some form of “judicially sanctioned relief.”214  A
district court within the Eighth Circuit used the “material alteration
in the legal relationship” standard to reach the same conclusion, but,
as several other courtshave done, it expanded the meaning of
212. S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d 49, 51 (1994) (“A person may not be a ‘prevailing party’ plaintiff
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent
decree, or settlement giving some of the legal relief sought. . .”).
213. New Eng. Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying fees
because the lower court failed to issue an “order compelling, or leading to [plaintiff’s sought
after relief]”); J.C. v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that
Buckhannon held that a prevailing party may only be applied to one who receives judicial
sanctioning through a judgment on the merits or a consent decree); Roberson v. Guilliani, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Representing the proposition that even though
private enforceable settlements may materially alter the legal relationship, it must be “judicially
sanctioned” in order to qualify plaintiff as a “prevailing party.”); Truesdell v. Philadelphia Hous.
Auth., 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2002) (The court found that an Order (1) contained mandatory
language, (2) is entitled “Order,” and (3) bears the signature of the District Court judge, not the
parties’ counsel, and (4) gave plaintiff the right to request judicial enforcement of the settlement
against defendant.); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2002) (Explaining the
difference between consent decree and private settlement because of the “Supreme Court’s
determination that a line should be drawn between them.”); Luis R. v. Joliet Township H.S.
Dist. 204, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13951, 4 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Private settlement agreements do no
confer prevailing party status”); Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 167 F.Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (D.S.D.
2001)(allowing plaintiff in a private settlement to achieve “prevailing party” status because “to
read Buckhannon to require one particular form for resolving a dispute in order to become a
prevailing party is to read the opinion too narrowly.”  Here, the court reasoned that because it
retained jurisdiction to enforce the “Settlement Agreement,” this was enough to satisfy the
“judicial imprimatur” requirement of Buckhannon); Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities
v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Fla. 2001); Am. Disability Ass’n v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315,
1317 (11th Cir. 2002) (Court approval of the terms of a settlement agreement coupled with its
explicit retention of jurisdiction are the functional equivalent of a consent decree); Akinseye v.
District of Columbia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2002).
214. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
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“consent decree” into the dominion of a settlement agreement.215
Steadfast in the minority, the Ninth Circuit, the D.C. District, and
Northern District of Florida have openly defied Buckhannon’s
expansion of its “catalyst theory” analysis into the realm of settlement
agreements.216  At the time of this writing, several Circuits had yet to
address the issue.
a. The Majority View
An articulate and comprehensive analysis discussing
Buckhannon’s limitation of the scope of attorney’s fees can be found
in the Fourth Circuit case of Smyth v. Rivero.217  There, plaintiffs sued
a state agency alleging that the statutory requirement of paternity
identification for welfare applicants violated the Social Security Act.
After a preliminary injunction, the agency modified its policy mooting
part of the claim.  The two sides then settled the remaining issues, and
the plaintiff moved for an award of fees.  The court interpreted
Buckhannon to explicitly reject private settlements as a basis for
prevailing party status, finding that an award was allowed only if a
plaintiff succeeded by means of a judicial order, a “consent decree,”
or a “functional” consent decree. 218  It implied that, while in some
cases a “functional” consent decree might not officially be labeled as
such, both forms contain the same characteristics.
Symth stated that a consent decree reflects “rules generally
applicable to other judgments and decrees.”219 The court favorably
cited precedent, which stated that a consent decree “may be enforced
by judicial sanctions, including citation for contempt if it is
215. Christina A., 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. See also Luis R., et al., v. Joliet Township H.S.
Dist. 204, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13951, *2, *5 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (allowing plaintiff to recover fees
when a hearing officer read the mediated settlement into the record.  The court reasoned that
the legal relationship between the parties changed because this reading had the “approval and
sanction” of the court).
216. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
court is bound by precedent in the Ninth Circuit allowing an award of attorney’s fees in private
settlements, but is not bound by dicta from the Supreme Court); Johnson v. District of
Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that attorney’s fee waiver in settlement
did not preclude “prevailing party status”); Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities v.
Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that defendants settling qualified the
plaintiffs as prevailing parties).
217. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002).
218. Id. at 281  n.10.
219. Id. at 280.
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violated.”220  The court noted that both actual and functional consent
decrees contain the following characteristics: (1) a demonstration by
the party claiming to be prevailing that “it has received some of the
relief it sought in bringing the lawsuit”;221 (2) careful judicial scrutiny
as to the fairness and lawfulness of the decree’s terms;222 (3) an
explicitly stated order for jurisdiction forcing the parties’ compliance
with the settlement’s terms;223 and (4) a court’s continuing
“jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the resolution.”224 Applying this
analysis to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the
agreement failed to reach consent decree status because the court did
not explicitly incorporate the settlement terms in the dismissal order,
nor did the agreement contain a provision retaining the court’s
jurisdiction.225
Several jurisdictions have followed a similar analysis to the
Smyth line of reasoning. The Southern District of New York in
Roberson v. Guilliani, for example, dismissed a plea for attorney’s
fees where the court retained jurisdiction but “did not review the
terms of the Agreement before dismissing the case.”226  The Roberson
court indicated as well that a consent decree must be “directly
enforceable through the district court’s contempt power.”227
But few jurisdictions have incorporated all of the factors used in
Smyth, instead construing “consent decree” much more liberally.  In
one example, a district court within the Seventh Circuit held that
simply reading the settlement agreement into the record before a
hearing officer was enough.228 In another case, a court entry
220. Id. at 280. (quoting United States v. Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439-40 (Former 5th Cir. 1981)
(en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring)).
221. Id. at n.11.
222. Id. at 29-30
223. Id. at 36.
224. Id. at 29.
225. Id. at 42.  See also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. Of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994)
(finding no jurisdiction to enforce private settlement but noting “the situation would be quite
different if the parties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had
been made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision (such as a provision
‘retaining’ jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the
settlement agreement in the order.”)
226. Roberson v. Guilliani, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
227. Roberson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *14.
228. Luis R. v. Joliet Township H.S. Dist. 204, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13951 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
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memorializing the claimant’s victory qualified.229  Judicial scrutiny of
the agreement’s fairness and enforcement of its terms were not
discussed in either case.  Similarly, the District of Nebraska has
professed its belief that a private settlement coupled only with an
explicit retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement qualifies as
a functional equivalent of a consent decree.230
In one of the more curious cases, the Eleventh Circuit hesitantly
accepted Buckhannon’s dicta of refusing awards for plaintiffs who
enter into settlement agreements as it stated that Buckhannon “at
least suggests that it is now the law.”231  Plaintiffs were disabled
individuals who allegedly failed to vote in the 2000 presidential
election as a result of violations of the National Voter Registration
Act (“NVRA”).  Plaintiffs eventually filed a “Request for Court
Approval of Settlement,” with an attached Settlement Agreement
signed by counsel for both sides.232  Without resolving any contested
issue, the court “ordered” the parties to abide by their settlement
agreement without putting on record the terms to which the
defendants agreed, and without ruling in plaintiff’s favor.233  In the
subsequent litigation for attorney’s fees, the same judge concluded
that the lack of these provisions did not affect the “order” from
qualifying as a consent decree.  As long as there was an order
“compelling the defendant to comply with specified terms” (here, the
“order” to abide by the settlement) the court concluded that plaintiff
could receive fees.234  When defendants challenged that no official
“order” was given by the judge, the court stated: “The
appropriateness of an award of fees surely ought not turn on whether
the court does or does not retype the provisions of a settlement
agreement as part of an order compelling compliance.” 235  The court
noted that one of Buckhannon’s reasons for its disapproval of fee
awards for private settlements was that federal jurisdiction to enforce
229. Johnny’s Icehouse, Inc., v. Amateur Hockey Ass’n of Ill., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11671,
*9 (N.D. Ill. 2001); See also Brandon K., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20006, at *8  (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(using Barron’s Law Dictionary to find the elements of a consent decree and hold that an
“Agreed Order” by an impartial hearing officer applies.).
230. Reed v. Shenandoah Memorial Hospital, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14867, *10 (D. Neb.
2002).
231. Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1278
232. Id. at 1275.
233. Id. at 1275-76.
234. Id. at 1278.
235. Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1278-79.
KLEIN - FINAL.DOC 03/04/03  2:41 PM
138 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 13:99
private settlements is often lacking.236  However, it reconciled this
concern by concluding that “in the case at bar such jurisdiction has
been explicitly retained.”237
It appears as though a majority of the courts implicitly recognize
that in a fees award case the first characteristic of the Smyth analysis
is a given: Plaintiffs must receive some of the relief sought.238  The
second characteristic looks to be exclusive to Smyth and the Fourth
Circuit. The trait that appears to be at the heart of the consent decree
analysis is what constitutes a judicial “order.”  A major source of
debate among the courts is whether the requisite judicial imprimatur
requires the power of contempt or is simply a term that indicates
some degree of judicial oversight.
b. The Minority View
Since Buckhannon, two courts have allowed the recovery of
attorney’s fees when a party gains a measure of relief through a
private settlement.239  Probably the most comprehensive analysis
derives from the D.C. district court in Johnson v. District of
Columbia.240
In Johnson, the mother of the plaintiff, a child in need of special
services, requested that the District of Columbia Public Schools
(DCPS) evaluate her son for special placement.241  A year of
solicitation and a lawsuit followed.242  In January of 2001, four months
prior to Buckhannon, the plaintiff entered into a settlement
agreement with the DCPS.243  One of the stipulations of the settlement
offer was a waiver of attorney’s fees.244  After agreeing to the
settlement, plaintiff sued, alleging that the waiver clause violated the
attorney’s fees provision of the Individuals with Disabilities
236. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7.
237. Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. See generally
Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 (reaffirming Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities); See
Christina A., 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1098-99 (finding by lower court in the Eighth Circuit reaching a
similar conclusion in a case on remarkably similar grounds).
238. See Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 n.5 (“There is
at least some basis for saying that the party favored by the settlement or decree prevailed in the
suit.”) (emphasis in original).
239. Johnson, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34; Barrios, 277 F.3d 1128.
240. Johnson, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34.
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Education Act (IDEA), a statute that includes “prevailing party”
language.245  Defendants argued that, regardless of whether that
provision was in the settlement agreement, Buckhannon disallowed
recovery of attorney’s fees in private settlements.246
The Johnson court acknowledged that Buckhannon’s
pronouncement regarding the “catalyst theory” may have spilled into
the private settlement arena.247  However, Johnson recognized that
the issue was not directly before the Supreme Court, and thus was not
conclusively resolved.  Johnson then, for several reasons, declined to
extend the holding in Buckhannon to private settlements.248
First, the Johnson court grasped onto the “material alteration”
criterion instead of the more demanding “judicially sanctioned”
standard.249  The court then drew an analogy between a settlement
agreement and a contract, which closely resembled the analysis by the
Eleventh Circuit.250 The court concluded that “private settlements do
constitute a material alteration in the legal relationship between two
parties sufficient to confer prevailing party status” because a court
holding jurisdiction over a settlement agreement can enforce its
terms.251  Directly disputing the rationale in Smyth, Johnson argued
that degrees of oversight and approval are “immaterial to whether
that settlement agreement is legally enforceable by a court.”252
Furthermore, Johnson recognized that since the specific issue in
Buckhannon was whether a defendant’s voluntary acquiescence to a
plaintiff’s wishes constituted a legal claim for attorney’s fees, any
language regarding private settlements was purely dicta.  Agreeing
with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Barrios v. California
Interscholastic Federation,253 the Johnson court prioritized prior circuit
court precedent as taking primacy over mere dicta from a Supreme
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 44-46.
248. Id. at 45.
249. Id.
250. Id.; See Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (employing
similar rationale).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 43 n.3.  (discrepancy with who may initiate the enforceable agreement.  In Smyth,
for example, the court strictly adheres to Buckhannon in holding that only a court may initiate a
legally enforceable order.  In Johnson, the court argues that the genesis of the direction is
irrelevant as to whether a court may oversee and enforce the agreement).
253. Barrios, 277 F.3d 1128.
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Court decision.254  Thus, “without a holding from the Supreme Court
or the D.C. Circuit to the contrary, this Court will not reject prior
D.C. Circuit precedent that allows for the award of attorney’s fees to
plaintiffs who enter into private settlements.”255
As eluded to above, the D.C. district court decision harmonized
its reasoning with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Barrios.  In Barrios, a
disabled baseball coach, having been repeatedly denied access to the
baseball field during games for safety reasons, sued an athletic
association alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement.  In a
footnote, the court concluded that Buckhannon involved a claim
under the “catalyst theory,” not a settlement agreement.  Echoing the
rationale of Johnson, the court stated, “we are not bound by that
dictum, particularly when it runs contrary to this court’s holding in
[prior precedent], by which we are bound.  Moreover, the parties, in
their settlement, agreed that the district court would retain
jurisdiction over the issue of attorney’s fees, thus providing sufficient
judicial oversight to justify an award.”256
IV.  CONCLUSION
The Buckhannon decision was a major deviation from
established circuit court precedent.  Justice Scalia, in concurrence,
states his opinion that this long-prevailing view “ha[d] been nurtured
and preserved by our own misleading dicta (to which I, unfortunately,
contributed).”257  Regardless of what one might think of Buckhannon,
the decision is now law.  As such, legal arguments regarding
Buckhannon should focus on its application and interpretation.258
Buckhannon has raised two main issues.  The first issue concerns
the fee-shifting language in attorney’s fees provisions other than the
ones at issue in the case.  The lower courts seem unified in the belief
that Buckhannon extends to all other statutes employing “prevailing
party” language.  Few courts have addressed the issue in the
“substantially prevailing” or “whenever appropriate” context.
Because “prevail” was the operative word in the Court’s depiction of
254. Johnson, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
255. Id.
256. Barrios, 277 F.3d 1128, at 15 n.5.
257. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J. concurring).
258. See ANNINO, supra note 7 (providing a thorough examination of suggestions as to how
to overcome the Buckhannon decision).
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“prevailing party” as a “legal term of art,” it would seem logical to
extend Buckhannon to statutes employing all forms of the root word
“prevail.”  However, statutes containing the “whenever appropriate”
language should be considered immune to the Buckhannon rationale.
Regardless of what the language of the fee-shifting provision directs,
Buckhannon did provide one way out: If the “explicit statutory
authority” of a particular statute indicates a deviation from the
normal method of interpretation, courts must respect Congress’s
alternate intention.
The second issue concerns judicial recognition of a plaintiff’s
level of success.  Clearly, judicial orders and consent decrees contain
the necessary “judicial imprimatur” to merit an award of fees.
However, Buckhannon indicates that there are more judicially
approved scenarios that would merit such an award.  This issue has
caused lower courts the most difficulty.  Some jurisdictions, such as
the Fourth Circuit, have set the bar high, requiring careful judicial
scrutiny of settlement terms and an explicitly stated order for
continued jurisdiction.  Others have only required the court to retain
jurisdiction.  The Ninth and D.C. Circuits have taken a contrasting
view, holding that dicta in Supreme Court decisions does not override
respective circuit court precedent.
This note has attempted to provide a “snapshot in time” of the
current issues and outcomes of most of the issues and sub-issues
facing the courts since Buckhannon.  Will the Ninth and D.C. Circuits
prevail in their rebellious interpretation of Buckhannon?  Probably
not in the long run, but it is difficult to say.  If the circuit courts have
learned anything from the Buckhannon opinion, it is to be cautious of
imprudent reliance on Supreme Court dicta, however justifiable.  It is
for this precise reason that courts should not put too much stock in
Buckhannon’s footnote four, or rely too heavily on Pennsylvania for
the theory that “whenever appropriate” language should be
interpreted in the same manner as “prevailing party” language.
